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Media coverage of the Charlie Hebdo crisis was striking for its triangulation of 
locations which are emblematic of contemporary France. From the banlieue where the 
attackers grew up, to the public spaces in central Paris where French national values 
were reasserted, space and its representation emerged as key perspectives from which 
to consider the events and what they reveal about the current state of the country. This 
article examines the spatial dynamics of the crisis, its visual representation, and their 
role in the framing and consumption of the events. It discusses the work of 
photographer John Perivolaris, present in Paris in the week following the crisis during 
a visit planned before the attacks. His images record how popular reaction was 
inscribed in public space, how memories of previous moments of resistance were re-
enacted, and how shifting forms of protest are indicative of broader pressures at work 
on contemporary France. 
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Connections 
Like the attacks on New York in September 2001, the events in Paris in January 2015 
were for most people lived and understood through mediation, and visual mediation 
especially. Rolling television news channels positioned reporters in key locations 
across Paris as the story of the assault on Charlie Hebdo started to emerge on the 
morning of Wednesday 7 January. On the morning of Friday 9 January, they carried 
live pictures of the police pursuit of the Kouachi brothers across Picardy to the village 
of Dammartin-en-Goële, where they took refuge in a printing factory prior to a final 
shoot-out that evening. Meanwhile, news anchors began broadcasting from the Place 
de la République in central Paris, which had emerged on the Wednesday evening as 
the epicentre of popular reaction to the attacks. The most visible response to the 
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attacks, the mass demonstration called by the Socialist government for Sunday 11 
January, took on spectacular proportions, and was mediated as such by the state 
broadcaster: helicopter footage and long shots from elevated cameras captured huge 
volumes of people moving along the boulevards from the Place de la République to 
the Place de la Nation. With a reported 1.5 million people joining the march, Le 
Monde (2015a) amongst other media outlets was soon claiming it as the largest 
gathering on the streets of Paris since the Liberation in 1944, and estimating that a 
further 2.5 million people had taken part in similar marches across metropolitan 
France. 
What the television coverage made strikingly clear was the role played by 
space and location as the events unfolded, and more precisely, by what can be termed 
the spatial dynamics of the crisis. By this, I mean the way in which the crisis took 
shape through movement across and between different locations over the five days 
separating the attack on the Charlie Hebdo and the Republican March, and brought 
those locations into contact. The motive force of the dynamic was the movement of 
the terrorists, which drew lines between a series of places in many ways emblematic 
of contemporary France, from the housing estates of the banlieue to the agro-
industrial plains of Picardy and the fringes of the Paris region, with its anonymous 
industrial units typical of contemporary peri-urban development. Even as the crisis 
continued to play itself out, with the Kouachi brothers on the run and Amedy 
Coulibaly holding hostages in the Jewish supermarket at the Porte de Vincennes, 
popular response to the attacks started to focus on the richly symbolic Place de la 
République. The square became a locus for the performance of national identity, 
solidarity and resistance through the resurrection of previous gestures of protest, 
including the waving of tricolour flags and the climbing of the monument at its centre. 
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An investment in symbolic public locations as a way of asserting collective and 
national identity was confirmed when the Place de la République was made the 
starting point of the state-organised Republican March on 11 January.1 
At the same time, while their targets had specific resonance in a French 
context, the terrorists made explicit reference to horizons beyond France by asserting 
their allegiance with the international jihadi struggle. It soon emerged that all three 
had long-standing connections with the transnational networks of radical Islamism. 
Arrested in 2004 while planning to join the Islamist insurgency in Iraq, Chérif 
Kouachi was sent to prison in Fleury-Mérogis, where he met Amedy Coulibaly and 
the radical French-Algerian cleric, Djamel Beghal, who began mentoring them both. 
Beghal was an associate of Smaïn Ait Ali Belkacem of the GIA (Groupe Islamique 
Armée), responsible for the bombing of the RER in Paris in 1995 during the Algerian 
civil war. Kouachi and Coulibaly would be regular visitors to Beghal’s house in the 
Cantal region during 2010, where he was being kept under police surveillance. At 
least one of the Kouachi brothers (there was uncertainty as to which) travelled to 
Yemen in 2011, possibly for military training, and in an interview with the 
commercial news channel BFM-TV during the siege at Dammartin, the pair said they 
had been commissioned and financed by the branch of Al Qaeda based there (Le 
Monde, 2015c). Coulibaly claimed allegiance to Islamic State and indicated that he 
and the Kouachi brothers had co-ordinated their attacks against Charlie Hebdo and 
the Jewish supermarket, in apparent disregard of the bitter rivalry between their 
respective sponsors (Byman, 2015). Like many radicalised Muslim men from 
Western Europe, Coulibaly justified his actions with reference to the Palestinian cause 
and the suffering of Muslim populations in conflicts prosecuted since 2001 as part of 
the American-led ‘War on Terror’ (Le Monde, 2015d; see also Hargreaves, 2015). 
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The terrorists’ gesture in carrying out the attacks was to bring back home the 
globalised conflict of terrorism and insurgency, opening up a front of that battle at the 
heart of their own country; but in doing so as French citizens, they simultaneously 
raised the question precisely of their own sense of identity, located-ness and 
attachment to the place of their birth. As Antoine Garapon (2015: 12) suggested, 
writing in the wake of the events, ‘les jeunes tentés par la radicalisation habitent 
plusieurs espaces mentaux, la France mais aussi le Moyen-Orient; ils sont ici et là-
bas’. In ‘avenging the Prophet’, as they declared on leaving the offices of Charlie 
Hebdo, the Kouachi brothers made clear that their actions were guided by a frame of 
reference which transcended the earthly laws and traditions of the secular French 
republic (from this point of view, the fact that an identity card was left behind in the 
car they crashed as they fled the vicinity of the attack could be read as indicative not 
so much of rash and careless amateurs, as of a symbolic rupture with their country of 
birth). 
For Garapon (2015: 11), the terrorists’ intervention, and the geopolitical 
allegiances which drove it, are symptomatic of broader processes of 
‘deterritorialization’ at work in the contemporary world, whereby the integrity and 
stability of the nation state are disrupted by forces which act on its territory, but 
whose sources lie beyond its purview (transnational terrorist networks would be one 
example, the global flows of capital associated with neoliberalism would be another). 
Indeed, if the attacks were lived as profoundly destabilising, both by the government 
and large sections of the population, and the spontaneous response to them was to 
gather in nationally significant locations, it was perhaps in part because they were 
recognised as an indication of the fragility of the domestic order and the country’s 
territorial integrity. In a move which Stuart Elden (2009: xxvii) notes is typical of 
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recent work on the threats posed to territorial sovereignty by terrorism, Garapon 
mobilises the notion of deterritorialization without reference to its origins in the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari (1972, 1980); but as Elden rightly points out, Deleuze and 
Guattari make clear in Mille plateaux (1980: 634–636) that processes of 
deterritorialization in turn provoke responses of re-territorialisation which attempt to 
curb or regulate the lines of flight it opens up: territory is not simply dissolved by 
deterritorialization, but reconfigured and remapped as a consequence of it. 
The aim in what follows is to explore what happened in Paris in January 2015 
from the point of view of space and territory. The article argues that mapping the 
spatial dynamics of the events helps to gain purchase both on the significance of the 
terrorists’ actions in the context of contemporary French society and on the nature of 
the responses to them, from the appearance of the viral Twitter meme #JeSuisCharlie 
on the city’s surfaces to the state’s co-ordination of popular feeling in its streets on 11 
January. In particular, and pursuing the Deleuzian perspective opened up by Garapon 
in his article, it will consider how the events bring into focus the question precisely of 
the place of the republic in contemporary France as guarantor of territorial stability 
and security, and where it is to be found. More specifically, it suggests that the events 
make manifest on-going pressures on the French nation state in the contemporary 
moment, and a prolonged crisis of identity of which the attacks and their aftermath 
were in fact only the latest development. 
In exploring these issues, the article engages with the work of urban 
photographer John Perivolaris, who spent time in the streets of Paris in the week 
following the crisis, during a visit planned before the attacks.2 His images capture the 
gestures, signs and performances through which responses to the attacks were 
articulated, and trace the frontier between the event of the protests and the non-events 
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of everyday life as they continued around it; but also important was his presence in 
the city as a photographer. His work invites us to think about how the photographic 
image helps us grasp the nature of space and the ways in which spaces are inscribed 
and practiced, not least in the context of an event of national trauma. That is to say, it 
returns us to the role of visual mediation in shaping the perception, construction and 
understanding of history. 
 
Aftermath 
Perivolaris arrived in Paris on the evening of Sunday 11 January, as the crowds which 
had assembled to march between Place de la République and Place de la Nation were 
beginning to thin and disperse. The images he took in and around République capture 
the aftermath of the popular demonstrations of outrage, solidarity and resistance 
which took shape in the square on the evening of 7 January, and were given official 
form and organisation by the Republican March on the afternoon of 11 January. 
While a part of the city frequently given over to organised demonstrations, with its 
wide boulevards and large squares, the particular circumstances of the march meant 
that the symbolism latent within the route’s topography and toponyms could be 
exploited to the full. Attended by vast numbers of people and led, for its opening few 
hundred metres at least, by President Hollande and forty or so heads of state from 
around the world, the march moved between two public spaces whose names could 
not be more resonant of French national identity and unity. Moreover, it did so down 
a boulevard named after Voltaire, whose work had resurfaced in the public sphere 
over the preceding days to stand for France’s central role in defining the fundamental 
principles of freedom of speech and civil liberty. [Figure 1 – République #7] 
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The popular occupation of the Place de la République was striking for a 
number of reasons. Over the course of its history, it has been an ambiguous and 
contested space. A key component of Haussmann’s strategic urbanism in the 
nineteenth century, it is dominated by one of the capital’s largest garrisons, built to 
quell the ‘classes dangereuses’ in the popular quarters of the Right Bank (Hazan, 
2002: 176), and has been the site in the past of staged performances of state power 
(De Gaulle presented the new constitution for the Fifth Republic there in September 
1958); but it has also seen spontaneous movements of public protest at various times: 
most notably, perhaps, the protests of May 1958 during the collapse of the Fourth 
Republic, or those ten years later during which the future of the Gaullist Fifth 
Republic was briefly called into question.3 
The gravitation towards République, which began in the hours after the attack 
on the Charlie Hebdo offices, was therefore in the spirit of those previous occupations 
of the square during moments of republican crisis. Likewise, the forms of protest 
which appeared (flag waving, climbing of the monument at the centre of the square) 
resurrected and re-enacted archetypal gestures, and their inscription within the mythic 
tradition of French protest was undoubtedly facilitated by visual representation. 
[Figure 2 – Paris After The Killing #11] Thus, and notwithstanding the different 
political contexts of the act, the flag waver high up on the monument in the Place de 
la République could be mistaken for a figure from the Mays of 1958 and 1968; and is 
indeed a mainstay of iconographies of protest stretching back through France’s 
revolutionary nineteenth century to the Revolution itself. 
Similarly, Sunday’s march was an event in which the physical occupation of 
space and movement through it were fundamental to creating its meaning as an 
expression of collective identity, shared values and commitment to democratic 
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principles, not least through the evocation – conscious or otherwise – of previous 
episodes of mass political expression.4 In Perivolaris’s images of aftermath, of the 
detritus left behind after the demonstrations, we can see traces of activity testifying to 
the population and mobilisation of space, of the passing through of participants drawn 
to express emotion and affect through their physical presence. [Figure 3 – Paris 
After The Killing #1] Spent matches are material remnants of gestures which are 
contingent and ephemeral in themselves (the striking of a match to light a candle) but 
which, through serial repetition, give substance to the event as a collective statement 
of solidarity and feeling. The lighting of candles, along with the waving of flags, the 
laying of flowers, or the writing of graffiti are also indications of the importance of 
gestures as a form of participation. They are inherently performative insofar as the 
action and its duration in time (the waving of the flag, the burning of the candle 
flame, the holding aloft of a slogan) are as important as the objects which permit and 
support it (the flag, the candle, the homemade sign). Taken together, they all 
contribute to the way in which the event took shape, constituted itself, and gathered 
memorial form. 
Indeed, Perivolaris’s images of aftermath in and around the Place de la 
République raise the broader question of the nature of an event, and how its contours 
are defined and identified. For the march of 11 January was, in effect, only the last 
phase of a sequence of actions which had begun the previous Wednesday with the 
assault on the offices of Charlie Hebdo and which, not least through the performative 
and symbolic intentions of the march itself, was already gaining historical form as an 
event, with its narrative shape characterised by a distinctive spatial dynamic in which 




The event which would end with Sunday’s mass mobilisation began with a series of 
moves round the Paris region by the attackers between the Wednesday morning and 
the Friday evening of the previous week. In their abruptness and the sense of 
disorientation they produced, they echoed the definition of the event offered by Slavoj 
Žižek (2014: 2) as ‘something shocking, out of joint, that appears to happen all of a 
sudden and interrupts the usual flow of things; something that emerges seemingly out 
of nowhere, without discernable causes, an appearance without solid being at its 
foundation’. Central to them was the quality distinct to acts of terrorism that 
spectators and participants have to follow and respond to the moves without being 
able to anticipate the next one, or the motives behind it. 
The particular shock of the terrorist act, arguably, lies in its sudden 
appropriation of agency and initiative, the power to determine becoming and futurity. 
It is a power over which the state is used to having control, and which it finds itself 
struggling to wrest back. The disruptiveness and unpredictability of terrorist agency 
was manifested most clearly in the flight of the Kouachi brothers after the shootings 
at Charlie Hebdo, pursued at once by the security forces and by the world’s media. 
Their moves were disconcertingly unreadable. Appearing at first to be making for the 
Belgian border, they went to ground in a forest near Vémars, before being sighted at a 
petrol station on the RN2 main road, and heading south back towards Paris. While the 
pursuit appeared to end by chance at Dammartin, reporters covering the story for 
rolling news channels, remembering the rocket-propelled grenades the brothers were 
alleged to have with them, and fuelled by a desire to make sense of their dérive, were 
quick to point out Dammartin’s proximity to the perimeter of Roissy airport, and 
therefore to one of the modern terrorist’s targets of choice, the passenger airliner. 
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If the brothers’ journey ended on the peri-urban fringe of Paris, it had its 
starting point both literally and figuratively in other marginal locations, yet ones 
which have become more powerfully symbolic of the contemporary nation – namely, 
the deprived housing estates which were the product of France’s post-war 
modernisation, and became home to a large proportion of its populations of immigrant 
origin during the post-colonial period. The Kouachi brothers, born to Algerian 
parents, were brought up in an HLM in the 19th arrondissement in Paris, and Chérif 
Kouachi was living in Gennevilliers, a working-class suburb to the north west of 
Paris, at the time of the attack. Coulibaly, meanwhile, whose parents were originally 
from Mali, grew up on the Grande Borne estate in Grigny (Essonne), one of the most 
iconic grands ensembles of the Trente Glorieuses. Conceived by the architect Émile 
Aillaud and completed in 1971, the estate comprised a set of low-rise (typically three- 
to five-storey) apartment blocks with sinuous forms overlooking pedestrianized 
communal spaces. Its design aimed to combat the problems of isolation and alienation 
which had emerged with the first wave of grands ensembles, such as Les 4,000 at La 
Courneuve north of Paris, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nevertheless, it did not 
remain immune from the problems of high youth unemployment, social exclusion and 
sporadic violence which have been endemic in the French suburbs since the early 
1980s, as Coulibaly’s own history of delinquency made clear (Bronner and Cazi, 
2015). 
Reporters from France and elsewhere were soon returning to the banlieue on 
the trail of the attackers. Keane (2015) offers an example of how the story was framed 
for television viewers in the UK, indicating a need to locate their origins in a specific 
place, and thereby give the event its ‘discernable causes’, to borrow Žižek’s phrase. 
The banlieue emerged as the event’s ‘solid foundation’, helping it to become legible 
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and comprehensible. Indeed, it was noticeable how the state itself began to explain 
what had happened in spatial and territorial terms. A fortnight after the attacks, during 
his New Year’s declaration of good wishes (vœux) to the press, the Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls, noting what he termed ‘la relégation périurbaine’ and ‘les ghettos’, 
argued that France suffers from ‘un apartheid territorial, social, ethnique’ (Valls, 
2015). While hardly an original claim, having been made repeatedly by a number of 
commentators since the mid-1980s, it was a telling one in the context: Valls’s 
comment served to re-position the attackers and their motivations within the territory 
of the French nation, to ground them there at the very moment when their actions and 
gestures were signalling their rupture with it, and testing the limits of the state’s 
authority over its territory. The need to do so on the part of both the media and the 
state signalled a sense of anxiety over the status and integrity of French territory after 
the attacks, which made manifest a force or momentum that had to be contained. In 
the manner of Deleuze and Guattari’s line of flight, this force cut through the 
structures and formations of the state in reaching towards other places, other 
battlegrounds and other authorities. Like Hollande’s call to assemble in the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks, Valls’s comments, emanating from the locus of state power, 
were a gesture of re-territorialisation by the state, part of its efforts to frame and 
contain what had happened by reasserting its purview and agency over the national 
territory, even if doing so meant articulating that territory as fractured or divided. 
To a degree, in other words, January’s drama was grounded in the seemingly 
fundamental, almost ontological opposition in France between centre and periphery, 
one which is all the more embedded because the economically, socially and culturally 
marginal occupy, for the most part, geographically peripheral locations. Moreover, a 
sense of that opposition was certainly accentuated by the gravitational pull exerted on 
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large numbers of the population by the symbolically dense spaces of the capital, 
which developed in direct response to the attackers’ movements through and around 
Paris, but which also produced a reaction of its own amongst those people, often 
living in the banlieue, who were reluctant to recognise themselves in the 
proclamation, ‘Je suis Charlie’. 
Yet the lines drawn between different locations by the movements of the 
attackers, and different peripheral locations especially – Grigny, Dammartin, the 
Porte de Vincennes – invite us to consider what is obscured by the straightforward 
binary opposition of centre and periphery as a way of reading the events. For Gilles 
Deleuze, ‘les lignes sont les éléments constituants des choses et des événements’ 
(1990: 50). By their nature, events are characterised by movement, momentum and 
becoming. It is through tracing lines drawn and movements made that the causes, 
significance and consequences of an event become apparent. In particular, the 
connections made by the attackers’ movements produce an effect of triangulation, 
whereby different locations are brought into relation in a way which maps out and 
reveals the history of France’s socio-economic development in the post-war period; 
the forces which shaped it and the spaces they produced; and the diverse pressures to 
which the country finds itself subjected in the present day. 
These connected locations, spaces and landscapes bear witness to the complex 
relationship between modernisation and decolonisation as it plays itself out in post-
war urban development, and inequality manifests itself in spatial terms in post-
colonial France. They signal how problems of inequality and social exclusion were 
reinforced following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, when 
manufacturing plants located in the suburbs and employing large workforces of 
immigrant origin began to close down as a result of global economic competition. 
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They reflect subsequent economic adjustments, with a decline in manufacturing 
industry bringing a shift towards light and tertiary industry, and a proliferation of 
warehouses and light industrial units near major road networks accompanying the 
increased circulation of goods and people as free movement was enshrined in the 
development of the European Union during the 1990s. At the same time, the nature of 
the responses which took shape in the capital, as well as the forms they took, were 
themselves revealing of some of the pressures at work in contemporary France, and 




One of the most important aspects of the popular response to the attacks was that it 
was taking place in two locations simultaneously: one physical, the other virtual. On 
the one hand, there was the physical occupation and practice of space which involved 
a diverse range of performative statements, including the waving of flags, the lighting 
of candles and the drawing of graffiti or street art. On the other, there was the viral 
circulation on social media of the slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’ coined by Joachim Roncin, 
artistic director at the French edition of Stylist, a weekly women’s magazine, who 
posted it on Twitter soon after news broke of the attack on Charlie Hebdo. Re-
circulated 3.4 million times over the following 24 hours, the hashtag #JeSuisCharlie 
would become one of the most re-tweeted memes in the company’s history (Potet, 
2015). [Figure 4 – JSC logo] 
Quite noticeably, the Twitter meme soon also started to appear in physical 
space. Striking too was the fact that it did so predominantly, at least in the first hours 
after the attacks, in the form of the improvised, spontaneous and interventionist script 
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of graffiti. The slogan’s material existence and its form both foreground the nature of 
graffiti as an expression of subjectivity, presence and identity through the physical 
trace of handwriting. At the same time, the act of inscription intrinsic to graffiti is 
intended as a claim to ownership of the space. The meme quickly began to proliferate 
on buildings, pavements and street furniture, including maps and plans of the city. 
[Figure 5 – République #10] The frequency with which these latter were inscribed is 
particularly suggestive. At one level, they offered prominent and visible surfaces for a 
spontaneous declaration of solidarity, one bound to catch the eye of passers-by. At 
another, the gesture of labelling or captioning cartographic representations of the city 
can also be seen to act out a desire to re-appropriate or reclaim ownership of it by its 
citizens – even if ownership by and for whom was itself a question lurking within the 
claim of solidarity and belonging articulated by Roncin’s meme, one which would 
break the surface in different ways as responses to the attacks took shape. 
Indeed, it is instructive to consider more closely the origins and fortunes of the 
‘Je suis Charlie’ slogan in this regard. In an interview with Roncin about its birth, the 
left-of-centre cultural magazine Les Inrockuptibles observed that 
 
Une myriade de références lui traverse l’esprit: le ‘Nous sommes tous Américains’ 
publié en une du Monde au lendemain du 11 Septembre, la série des Où est Charlie?, 
qu’il fait découvrir à son fils de 5 ans, le ‘Je suis un Berlinois’ prononcé par Kennedy 
en 1963, auquel il a sûrement pensé inconsciemment. (Boinet, 2015) 
 
Notable (and perhaps surprising) by their absence from this list of possible points of 
reference are the slogans of May 1968, despite them being arguably the most obvious 
historical antecedents for creative sloganeering in times of protest. Yet echoes of May 
1968 are to be found, and emerge especially when the meme takes on evolved or 
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adapted forms: one of the most common was ‘on est tous Charlie’, with its subtle but 
significant shift from a singular ‘je’ to a more broad-based, collective ‘on’, which is 
unmistakably a memory of the famous ‘nous sommes tous des juifs allemands’ 
uttered in support of Daniel Cohen-Bendit as he faced expulsion from France as a 
result of his leadership of the student revolt. 
Nevertheless, if the Twitter meme is a step removed from the protest slogans 
of 1968, it is so not simply because of the new ways in which it circulates, but 
because of the form it takes. As Roncin makes clear in his interview, it was conceived 
from the start as a brand or logo as much as a slogan; that is to say, as an object in 
which visual form is as important as linguistic content: ‘j’ai pris le logo de Charlie 
Hebdo pour en faire autre chose. C’est ce que je fais tous les jours: remixer des 
images, donner une nouvelle vie à des objets en les refaçonnant. J’adore la pop 
culture, le détournement’ (Boinet, 2015).5 Roncin created his logo by retaining the 
typographical form of the first half of the satirical magazine’s title, using the house 
font of his magazine for the phrase ‘je suis’, and combining them on a jet black 
background whose connotations of mourning are plain. If the slogan certainly 
multiplied and morphed in reaching the streets as graffiti, it was in the stable and 
standardised form of the logo that it became most visible in public space, whether 
through projection on public buildings in Paris and around the world, or the holding 
aloft of home-printed copies by those gathered at the Place de la République and other 
places of protest. 
The shift from slogan to logo, and the simultaneous proliferation of that logo 
in public space, are at once telling and unsurprising. They both reflect broader 
economic and cultural shifts at work in the contemporary period. Roncin’s seemingly 
instinctive turn to the logo form as a way of articulating his reaction to the events – he 
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noted (Roncin, 2015) that he created it because he was ‘sans mot’ – is an indication of 
the status and currency of the logo in contemporary culture; but as Naomi Klein 
(2000) was among the first to remind us, logos are also central to a neoliberal 
economy of consumption which is predicated on subjective investment in the 
particular set of ‘values’ or connotations carried by logos and brands on behalf of the 
products they identify, rather than the products themselves. That popular response to 
the attacks became channelled most visibly through the adoption of Roncin’s logo 
was entirely appropriate within a culture geared towards the egocentric consumption 
and display of signs.6 
At the same time, those general trends, which signal the growing influence of 
multinational corporations in a globalised economy, have been felt particularly 
acutely in contemporary France, as it attempts to negotiate the increasingly tense, not 
to say unequal, relationship between state power on the one hand, and the power of 
capital on the other (Waters, 2012). The pressures placed on the country by the power 
of global capital are expressed in Perivolaris’s photograph of an old man on a street 
corner standing next to a shop front displaying the logos of Adidas and Reebok, 
international sports goods manufacturers. [Figure 6 – République #13] The image 
captures how corporate identity asserts itself in public space, as buildings become 
platforms for the display of corporate logos and brand identities. Furthermore, those 
logos are presented in ways clearly intended to enhance their auratic quality. The use 
of subdued monochrome, with black logos set against a grey background, has the 
effect of emphasising their formal qualities and thereby, their recognisability and 
status as icons.7 The old man looks strangely out of place against this backdrop. His 
dress and manner lend him an appearance more familiar from the street photography 
of Robert Doisneau or Willy Ronis in post-war, working-class Paris. Through his 
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embodiment of the past in the corporatized space of the contemporary Parisian street, 
the image takes on an allegorical quality. It signals the distance travelled by France 
during the post-war period; its steady but uneven transformation into a post-industrial, 




Also present in this image, through the old man’s stasis and the quiet of the street, is a 
sense of being on the fringes of the event, at the point where the energy of the protests 
rippling out from République has dissolved away into the non-event of daily life. 
Agency seems to lie elsewhere; and the question of agency and its location is 
precisely what is raised by the image, and by the events of January 2015 more 
broadly. The events played out across the spaces and territories of the Republic in 
January reveal its place to be ambiguous and uncertain. On the one hand, the Republic 
could not have been more visible, that visibility predicated on the use and occupation 
of space in order to re-establish Republican order and identity; but its extreme 
visibility was also a sign of uncertainty, the desire to assert the presence of the 
Republic an indication of the threat to which it felt exposed. January’s events were a 
crisis of territory, and therefore of national identity; but in many ways, it was a crisis 
which had already been in play for some time, and whose contours the attacks only 
served to delineate more clearly. The threat to the integrity of the Republic posed by 
Islamic extremism is only the latest form of pressure on the contemporary French 
state from extra-territorial forces, of which the global capital flows associated with 
neoliberalism are the most obvious and visible.8 
 19 
The cultural logic of those forces found form most powerfully in the mass 
adoption of a slogan whose peculiar contradictions signalled division even as it 
seemed to assert belonging and solidarity. ‘Je suis Charlie’ makes a claim which is 
simultaneously inclusive (I identify with Charlie) and exclusive (I am talking about 
myself) at its very moment of articulation and which, through its emphasis on the first 
person singular, can only really point to an aggregation of singularities. Even the ‘on’ 
of ‘on est tous Charlie’ falls short of expressing an explicitly collective identity, a first 
person plural; and in any case, it was a gesture of identification that large sections of 
the French population (many of whom were located in the sorts of geographically 
marginal places familiar to the attackers) were not prepared to make. The events of 
January 2015 are troubling at once for their uniqueness – their once-in-a-lifetime 
combination of horror, grief and euphoria – and also because they crystallise so many 
of the historical, social and economic pressures at work on the country; pressures 
which the moment of apparent solidarity and resistance they produced ultimately did 
more to confirm than to defuse.9 
 
Notes 
1. The terrorists were also keen to ensure a visual trace of their actions would remain. 
In the days afterwards, Le Monde (2015b) reported that they had equipped themselves 
with wearable GoPro video cameras, indicating a clear intention to record and stage 
their acts as spectacle for posterity. During the sieges at Dammartin and the Porte de 
Vincennes, both the Kouachi brothers and Amedy Coulibaly had spoken willingly to 
BFM-TV, one of France’s main commercial news channels; and on the morning of 11 
January, in a move typical of terrorist groups in the age of social media, two videos in 
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which Coulibaly discussed the attacks were published on the websites of YouTube 
and Dailymotion, before being taken down by the French Interior Ministry.  
2. Our collaboration in this article is part of an on-going dialogue on questions of 
space, movement, identity and urban peripheries in Paris (Perivolaris and Welch, 
2014a, 2014b), itself inflected by the coincidence of a long-planned trip to the city by 
Perivolaris with the aftermath of the attacks.  
3. The tension between popular and official occupation of the square was made 
strikingly manifest on 11 January in the unexpected and cognitively dissonant sight of 
CRS riot police, so often the most visible and threatening expression of state power 
during popular protest, being applauded by the assembled public. 
4. The ghosts of a number of events could be felt, from the demonstration against the 
Charonne metro deaths in the last days of the Algerian War in 1962, to the protests of 
May 1968, including the Gaullists’ triumphant march along the Champs Élysées 
which brought the period to a close. Alongside these are more occulted memories, 
such as the silent march through Paris by Algerians on the evening of 17 October 
1961, which ended in brutal suppression by the police. 
5. Roncin’s casual reference to the Situationist concept of détournement here, almost 
as an afterthought, is indicative at once of the presence of May 68 and post-war 
radical culture in the collective unconscious, and of their absorption as ludic rather 
than political acts. 
6. The fact that Roncin’s logo quickly became subject to a struggle over its copyright 
and commercial usage is equally symptomatic of the latent monetary value it was 
perceived to have: while Roncin himself refused to seek copyright for the slogan, 
France’s national intellectual property authority, the INPI, declined to accept any of 
the 120 applications to do so that it received from third parties (Boinet, 2015). 
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7. Moreover, the increasing sophistication of corporate brand management is reflected 
in the playful disruption of the logos: thus, the second ‘a’ of Adidas in the brand’s 
classic trefoil logo is transposed below to form the beginnings of the more recent 
version based on three stripes. 
8. Indeed, one of the most striking things about the organisation and structures of 
contemporary Islamist terrorist movements is how they resemble those of global 
corporations, for example through the use of a franchising model whereby the name 
(‘brand’) of the organisation is adopted by individuals or groups who are inspired by 
its aims even if they have no direct or formal relationship with it (Francis, 2015). That 
the desire for symbolic capital through affiliation is as much to do with brand identity 
as ideological substance is reflected in the fact that the three terrorists could claim to 
have worked together on their attacks despite the fierce competition between their 
sponsoring organisations, of which they appeared to have little knowledge or interest. 
9. Final revisions were being made to this article when a second wave of terrorist 
attacks struck Paris on the evening of Friday 13 November 2015. 130 people were 
killed by gunmen in co-ordinated assaults on locations in the 10th and 11th 
arrondissements not far from the Place de la République, including bars, restaurants 
and the Bataclan concert venue. Three terrorists blew themselves up outside the Stade 
de France in St Denis having tried to get into the stadium, where a football match 
between France and Germany was being broadcast live on television. Faced once 
again with a threat to France’s sovereign territory, François Hollande quickly declared 
a state of emergency, tightening security at the country’s borders. Meanwhile, Islamic 
State claimed responsibility for the attacks, and details of a transnational network of 
terrorist movement emerged, connecting Paris with Belgium and Syria, via the 
increasingly well-trodden migration route through Greece and the Balkans. Without 
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the structuring focal point provided by Charlie Hebdo, and more obviously unsettled 
by the arbitrary violence of the assaults, public response in the following days was 
confused and hesitant compared to the previous January.  
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